One service runs the floor. Browsers are the workstations.
| Step | What happens | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Client data arrives | The mailer receives client data for a direct mail campaign. Presort software processes it for optimal postage rates and delivery routing, then outputs a highly specific file called a mail.dat — used for postage payment and logistics. Typically the only people who ever touch this file are USPS and shipping logistics services. |
| 2 | FloorPulse reads the mail.dat | The mail.dat ZIP drops into a hotfolder on the FloorPulse server. The system parses it automatically — every piece, tray, pallet, and destination mapped and live on the floor in seconds. FloorPulse is the first product to put this data to work on the production floor. |
| 3 | Workstations connect | Any device with a browser — tablet, phone, Chromebook, laptop — connects to the local server. No software to install. No per-seat license. Browser IS the workstation. |
| 4 | Operator scans | Scans a piece barcode (IMb) via handheld scanner, Bluetooth, or device camera. The correct tray tag prints instantly on a Zebra thermal printer. Under 2 seconds. |
| 5 | Pallet completes | When the last child tray in a pallet is scanned, the pallet placard generates automatically on the laser printer. No manual step. No paper to collate. |
| 6 | Dashboard updates | Supervisors see real-time job progress across all stations via WebSocket — without walking the floor. Every scan is timestamped and traceable. |
Enterprise vendors serve $50K–$200K+ budgets. In-house tools serve one facility each and die with their developer.
FloorPulse is the only product that combines mail.dat-native scan-to-print tray tagging, automatic pallet placard generation, real-time multi-station production visibility, chain of custody tracking, and browser-based workstation access in a single on-premises package at $300–$400/month.
| Capability | Enterprise vendors | Whittier Tagger | In-house tools | FloorPulse |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tray tagging | ✓ | ✓ | Sometimes | ✓ |
| Pallet placards | ✓ | — | Sometimes | ✓ Auto |
| Real-time visibility | Varies | — | — | ✓ |
| Chain of custody | Varies | — | — | ✓ |
| Browser workstations | — | — | — | ✓ |
| On-premises | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Price | $50K–$200K+ | Lower | Internal cost | $300–$400/mo |
$15/day. 234–560 hours/year recovered. Below the CapEx threshold.
| Revenue per customer | $3,600–$4,800/yr |
| Cloud/hosting cost | $0 (on-prem) |
| COGS per customer | Near zero |
| Gross margin | 95%+ |
| Hours recovered/year | 234–560 |
| Working days recovered | 29–70 |
| Cost per working day | $15–$20 |
| Break-even threshold | 1 hour/day saved |
Pricing validated through direct buyer conversations and LinkedIn build-in-public campaign. Below CapEx threshold — ops manager approves as routine operating expense.
These are arithmetic, not hockey sticks.
Not a market breakthrough — a rounding error.
4,000 MSP facilities. 79 customers = self-sustaining. FloorPulse doesn't need to win the market. It needs to reach the facilities that have been waiting for this product to exist at a price they can justify.
$500K buys 24 months, 2 sales resources, a proper W-2 team.
The product is built. Every dollar of revenue comes from facility subscriptions, and every subscription starts with a demo, a conversation, and a close. Sales capacity is the single constraint. That's why 52% goes directly to sales.
By month 24, cumulative customer revenue could reach $150–200K, extending effective runway and reducing net capital consumed to ~$300–350K. Every new customer simultaneously generates revenue and increases founder compensation.
Also pursuing the IEDA Demonstration Fund (up to $100K, non-dilutive) as a complementary layer. The equity raise and IEDA application are designed to work independently or together.
Stated honestly. The contingency plan exists because pretending the risk doesn't is how founders lose their companies.
The product is built and deployed — it runs without the developer present. Support lead handles day-to-day operations. Developer hire planned at 100-customer milestone. Codebase is mainstream C#/ASP.NET Core with PostgreSQL — large hiring pool.
Pre-revenue with a finished product is fundamentally different from pre-revenue with an idea. Product is complete, website live, pricing published. The predecessor at Capstone generated $500K/year from 5 enterprise clients with no dedicated sales effort.
Capital is specifically allocated for two dedicated sales hires. Compelling ROI story ($15/day to recover 234+ hours/year), live website, niche market with reachable buyers through known channels.
At $4,800/year, 400 facilities (10%) generates $1.9M ARR. Modular platform supports expansion into adjacent workflows. In-plant market extends TAM beyond MSPs.
Operating budget addresses this directly. Founder compensation scales with customer acquisition. Support lead on W-2. Health insurance is the first addition when revenue supports it. Both people are fully committed and available immediately.
If the sales function has been funded, the trade shows attended, the product demonstrated, and the market still isn't buying — then the thesis was wrong and we shut it down. I will not burn an investor's remaining capital hoping for a turnaround the data doesn't support.
A platform that grows with demand. A company owned by the people who build it.
FloorPulse is modular by design. The core platform — mail.dat parsing, local server, browser UI, real-time infrastructure — supports additional application modules.
A facility has already requested Module 2, validating the platform approach with organic market pull.
The long-term goal is a company owned by the people who build and support the product — not optimized for a liquidation event.
How it works: Founder sells equity to the ESOP trust over time (~10%/year), creating a gradual, tax-advantaged transition at fair market value.
Investor exit: ESOP purchases investor shares at fair market value — or earlier if both parties agree on a buyback.
Alternative: BlueCrest expressed strong interest in production visibility during the Capstone era — significant enough to pursue an acquisition. BlueCrest personnel are actively following the FloorPulse build-in-public campaign on LinkedIn.
What I need from an investor — and what I don't
I don't want someone to throw money at this in hopes of making a return. I've seen that movie. At Capstone, the investors funded headcount ahead of revenue, assumed growth would follow spending, and shut the company down when it didn't. The product didn't fail — the business was built on hope instead of discipline.
What I need is a partner who participates — not someone who writes a check and watches from the sideline. Someone who brings industry access, operational experience, or knowledge of a better approach to getting this product into facilities faster.
The right investor makes the sales cycle shorter — through connections, credibility, or experience that money alone can't buy. An investor with a rolodex in this industry changes the math entirely. The wrong investor is the one who funded Capstone.