

FLOOR PULSE NET, LLC — IOWA

FloorPulse

Production visibility for mail manufacturing

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The industry

4,000 facilities. \$90+ billion in mail volume. Zero production visibility.

Mail Service Providers are the manufacturing backbone of the mailing industry. They process millions of pieces per day — first-class transactional mail, marketing mail, compliance-sensitive documents — across production floors running high-speed inserters, digital presses, and automated sorting equipment.

These are sophisticated manufacturing operations. The equipment counts pieces, reads barcodes, and tracks throughput. But the production floor itself — which jobs are running at which stations, which version of a file is in production, whether the right destination shipped first — has no real-time visibility system. Supervisors manage by walking the floor and making radio calls. Status comes from asking, not from knowing.

The machines count. They can't think.

Every barcode on every mail piece carries version, destination, and sequence information. Nothing on the production floor hears it. The data exists — it's locked inside tools that weren't built for the people standing at the workstation.

[Video placeholder: 30–45 second industry montage — inserters running at speed, trays stacking, operators at stations, pallets being built. Hosted on YouTube, linked from investor.html.]

The problem → the solution

Your machines count. They can't think. FloorPulse gives the floor ears.

Equipment	What it reports	What it can't tell you	What FloorPulse hears
Digital press	"50,000 printed"	Which version? Which destination?	Ver. A: 30K done. Ver. B: 20K done.
Insertter	"8,200 inserted"	Which trays done? Can that pallet ship?	Dallas: 14 trays done. Pallet ready.
MIS / ERP	"Job 60% complete"	Which 60%? The right 60%?	Dallas: 100% shipped. Chicago: 40% in progress.

The primary value is **continuous visibility into what's being produced correctly** — which version is running, which destination is being built, how far along, verified by barcode at every scan. Error detection (wrong version, duplicate scan, file mismatch) is a natural byproduct of that visibility. The floor knows what's right because every correct scan confirms it.

Role	Without FloorPulse	With FloorPulse
Shipping	"Which drop is ready?"	"Dallas done. Dock 3."
Client services	"Did Ver. A ship?"	"Ver. A shipped 3pm."
Supervisors	"Right job running?"	"Priority job running."
Management	"Will we make SLA?"	"Both SLAs on track."

Scan it. Track it. Pulse it.

The barcodes were always screaming. Now there are ears on the floor. For less than a burger and fries a day.

[Interactive version: [problem-solution-infographic.html](#) auto-toggles between states on [investor.html](#). Demo video follows.]

How it works

One service runs the floor. Browsers are the workstations.

Step	What happens	Detail
1	mail.dat ZIP arrives	Drops into a hotfolder on the FloorPulse server. The system consumes it automatically — parses HDR, SEG, CSM, CQT, PQT, PBC/PDR records. Job data is live on the floor in seconds.
2	Workstations connect	Any device with a browser — tablet, phone, Chromebook, laptop — connects to the local server. No software to install. No per-seat license. Browser IS the workstation.
3	Operator scans	Scans a piece barcode (IMb) via handheld scanner, Bluetooth, or device camera. The correct tray tag prints instantly at their workstation on a Zebra thermal printer. Under 2 seconds.
4	Pallet completes	When the last child tray in a pallet is scanned, the pallet placard generates automatically on the laser printer. No manual step. No paper to collate.
5	Dashboard updates	Supervisors see real-time job progress across all stations via WebSocket — without walking the floor. Every scan is timestamped and traceable. Chain of custody to the individual piece.

DEPLOYMENT

On-premises

No cloud. No PII exposure. All data stays in the building.

INFRASTRUCTURE

One machine

Docker container. Under a desk. Sets up in an afternoon.

LICENSING

Zero per-seat

Unlimited workstations. One site license covers the facility.

UPDATES

Real-time

WebSocket push. No polling. No refresh. Instant.

The market

Self-sustainability requires just 2% of the market.

Segment	Facilities	ARR at standard price	Source
Registered MSPs (TAM floor)	~3,900	—	USPS OIG FY2014 (MS-WP-15-003)
In-plant operations (conservative)	~5,200	—	InfoTrends estimate, 10% of peak
Total addressable market	~9,100	\$43.7M	
Serviceable market (SAM)	~4,000–5,000	\$19–\$24M	Mid-size MSPs + corporate in-plant

Milestone	Customers	% of MSP market	ARR
Self-sustaining	79	2.0%	~\$330K
5-year target	200	5.0%	~\$840K
BHAG	400	10.0%	~\$1.68M

Enterprise engagements and Module 2 (commingle/co-palletization routing) revenue are excluded from all projections. Both represent pure upside. The in-plant market (corporate facilities processing EOB, HIPAA, compliance-sensitive mail) extends the addressable market well beyond registered MSPs.

Target customer: Mid-size MSPs — 5–20 workstations, multi-shift operations. Big enough to feel the pain of no visibility, not big enough to build custom tooling or afford enterprise platforms (\$50K–\$200K+). This segment has had no purpose-built option at an appropriate price point.

Buyer: The operations manager or plant manager. At \$4,800/year, FloorPulse falls below many CapEx thresholds — approved as a routine operating expense without procurement committees or C-suite sign-off.

Why this exists

The market told us what they wanted. The last company refused to ship it.

9 years at Capstone Technologies

Director of Software Solutions. Designed and led development of AutoViri™, a SaaS automation platform with production floor visibility as a core component.

\$500K/year from 5 clients — without trying

The visibility component was bundled into large automation packages sold to just five enterprise accounts. That revenue came with no published pricing, no dedicated sales, and no active go-to-market.

MSPs asked to buy it — repeatedly

We showed MVPs at NPF, MAILCOM, and regional conferences. The response was consistent and specific: "We would buy this." Not "that sounds interesting" — they told us directly they would buy it.

Capstone never shipped it

Never gave them a price. Never launched. Never actively sold the product. The company grew staff ahead of revenue, assuming money would follow headcount. It didn't. Capstone folded — not because the product failed, but because the business was built on hope instead of discipline.

Now I am

FloorPulse is complete. The website is live. The pricing is published. The market has been telling me what they want for nine years. The only reason they don't already have it is because the last company refused to ship it.

39

years in the industry

\$500K

annual SaaS from 5 clients

3,900

facilities never got the chance

Competitive landscape

The most common competitor is no system at all.

Capability	Enterprise platforms	Whittier Tagger	In-house tools	FloorPulse
Scan-to-print tray tags	Yes	Yes	Varies	Yes
Auto pallet placards	Yes	No	Varies	Yes
Real-time floor visibility	Yes	No	Varies	Yes
Chain of custody	Yes	No	Rarely	Yes
Browser workstations	Varies	No	Rarely	Yes
On-prem / no cloud	Varies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Commercially supported	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Annual price	\$50K-\$200K+	Lower + hardware	Internal dev cost	\$3,600-\$4,800

The majority of mid-size facilities manage production with laser-printed paperwork, walkarounds, and radio calls. They don't have a system because no system has existed at their price point and complexity level. Enterprise vendors (Solimar, Quadient, BlueCrest) serve facilities with \$50K-\$200K+ budgets. The Whittier Tagger (now part of BlueCrest/Window Book) solves tag printing but not visibility, coordination, or audit trail. In-house tools serve one facility each and die with their developer.

FloorPulse is the only product that combines mail.dat-native scan-to-print tray tagging, automatic pallet placard generation, real-time multi-station production visibility, chain of custody tracking, and browser-based workstation access in a single on-premises package at \$300-\$400/month.

Pricing & unit economics

\$15/day. 234–560 hours/year recovered. Below the CapEx threshold.

DESIGN PARTNER

\$0

for 90 days

Limited to 2 facilities, Omaha metro. White-glove deployment. Converts to Founding rate.

FIRST 10 CUSTOMERS FOUNDING PARTNER

\$300/mo

\$3,600/year

Rate locked 2 years. Unlimited workstations. Full support 7AM–5PM CST. 90-day money-back guarantee. \$15/working day.

STANDARD

\$400/mo

\$4,800/year

Unlimited workstations. No per-seat fees. Full support 7AM–5PM CST. 90-day money-back guarantee. \$20/working day.

Unit economics

Revenue per customer	\$3,600–\$4,800/yr
Cloud/hosting cost	\$0 (on-prem)
COGS per customer	Near zero
Gross margin	95%+

Customer ROI

Hours recovered/year	234–560
Working days recovered	29–70
Cost per working day	\$15–\$20
Break-even threshold	1 hour/day saved

Pricing validated through direct buyer conversations (Capstone sales engineer: \$450/mo comfortable, \$400/mo with negotiation room) and LinkedIn build-in-public campaign. Below CapEx threshold — ops manager approves as routine operating expense.

Financial projections

These are arithmetic, not hockey sticks. Enterprise and Module 2 revenue excluded.

Year	Customers	ARR	Operating cost	Net income (loss)
Year 1	25	~\$105K	~\$275–311K	(~\$170–206K)
Year 2	50	~\$222K	~\$325–362K	(~\$103–140K)
Year 3	100	~\$456K	~\$350K	\$106K
Year 4	150	~\$696K	~\$420K	\$276K
Year 5	200	~\$936K	~\$450K	\$486K

Key assumptions

First 10 customers at Founding rate (\$3,600/yr).
Subsequent at Standard (\$4,800/yr). Blended ~\$4,200 through first 50. Founder salary ramps with customer count: \$48K → \$100K at 79 customers (~\$660 per customer). Year 1–2 costs reflect founder + support lead (W-2) + 2 sales. Year 3+ adds developer hire and expanded travel.

Breakeven analysis

Pre-investment (founder only)	~7 customers
Post-investment (full team)	79 customers
Post-investment market share	2.0% of MSPs

Revenue begins arriving during the raise period. By month 24, cumulative customer revenue could reach \$150–200K, reducing net capital consumed to ~\$300–350K and extending effective runway beyond the 24-month raise period.

Growth milestones

Every hire earned, not assumed. Revenue before growth — not after.

Milestone	Customers	ARR	Action triggered
Foundation	25	~\$105K	Sales #1 active, support lead (W-2) active, 1st trade show
Traction	50	~\$222K	Sales #2 hired (inherits playbook), 2nd trade show, referral pipeline
Self-sustaining	79	~\$330K	Revenue covers all operations. No outside capital needed.
Momentum	100	~\$420K	Developer hire evaluation, Module 2 go/no-go decision
Scale	200	~\$840K	Sales expansion, second support hire
BHAG (10%)	400	~\$1.68M	Renegotiate target to 20% (800 facilities)

\$500K allocation (24 months)

Sales ~\$262K

Support ~\$161K

Founder ~\$146K

Shows \$70K

Buffer

Sales #1 hired month 1 to prove the cycle. Sales #2 hired month 6–7 with proven playbook. Support lead as W-2 employee (not 1099). Founder salary tied to customer acquisition. Health insurance added when revenue supports it — first addition, not last.

The Capstone lesson: I watched a company grow staff ahead of revenue, assuming money would follow headcount. It didn't. FloorPulse will grow when revenue supports growth — not before. Every hire in this plan is justified by customer demand, not by a projection on a spreadsheet.

The team

Lean is a feature, not a bug. Two people run the business. A third handles the books.

Mike Miller — Founder, developer, product owner

39 years in mail production software, USPS compliance, presort operations, and production floor systems. Designed and led development of AutoViri™ at Capstone Technologies. Handles all development, architecture, product decisions, and customer relationships. Salary ramps with customer count (~\$660/customer) — tied to the same metric the investor's return is tied to.

Support lead — Implementation, training, support (W-2)

Identified — former Capstone colleague who held this exact role. Knows the product domain and is available immediately. Tier 1/2 customer support, on-site installation, operator and supervisor training, documentation, how-to videos. Comes on as W-2 employee, not 1099 contractor.

Sales #1 — Dedicated, hired at month 1

Structure TBD in first 90 days — full-time, fractional, or commission-based with industry contacts. Dedicated to FloorPulse pipeline, demos, and close rates. Not a reseller. Proves the sales cycle, dials in the pitch, builds the playbook for Sales #2.

Sales #2 — Staggered hire, month 6–7

Inherits the proven playbook from Sales #1. Doubles pipeline capacity for the remaining 18 months of the raise. Two dedicated sales resources working trade shows, direct outreach, and the LinkedIn pipeline simultaneously.

Bookkeeping handled by the founder's partner — experienced in double-entry accounting, manages AR/AP/tax prep coordination using GnuCash. Professional accountant handles year-end. Developer hire evaluated at the 100-customer milestone, not before.

The ask

\$500,000

24 months of runway to reach self-sustainability

24

months runway

4

person team

2

dedicated sales

79

customers to sustain

Use of funds	Amount (24 mo)	% of raise
Sales function (2 hires, staggered)	~\$262K	52%
Support lead (W-2, 24 months)	~\$161K	32%
Founder salary (ramping with customers)	~\$120–172K	24–34%
Trade shows + travel (NPF, MAILCOM, customer visits)	~\$70K	14%
Hardware, legal, tools, contingency	~\$60K	12%

What investors are buying

The gap between "product is ready" and "product is in 79 facilities." Product risk is eliminated. Market risk is minimal — these customers have been asking for this for years. Execution risk is what capital addresses: hiring sales, funding support, and getting into facilities.

Revenue offsets the burn

By month 24, cumulative customer revenue could reach \$150–200K, extending effective runway well beyond the raise and reducing net capital consumed to ~\$300–350K. Every new customer simultaneously generates revenue and increases founder compensation.

The company is also pursuing the IEDA Demonstration Fund (up to \$100K, non-dilutive) as a complementary layer. An IEDA award demonstrates state-level validation and strengthens the company's position in private fundraising conversations. The equity raise and IEDA application are designed to work independently or together.

Why sales is the entire bet

The product is built. Development costs are minimal and ongoing — the base platform is complete, and new features are added when they open doors for many customers, not just one. Every dollar of FloorPulse revenue comes from facility subscriptions, and every subscription starts with a demo, a conversation, and a close. Sales capacity is the single constraint on how fast this company reaches self-sustainability. That is why 52% of this raise goes directly to sales, why we want the full investment up front, and why sales cannot be restricted or staged in a way that limits pipeline. Capital can be deployed in stages if an investor prefers that structure — but the sales function must be funded without interruption from day one. Restricting sales is restricting revenue.

Risks & mitigations

Stated honestly. The contingency plan exists because pretending the risk doesn't is how founders lose their companies.

Structural

Single-person development dependency

The product is built and deployed — it runs without the developer present. Support lead handles day-to-day operations. Developer hire planned at 100-customer milestone. Codebase is mainstream C#/ASP.NET Core with PostgreSQL — large hiring pool.

Revenue

Pre-revenue company

Pre-revenue with a finished product is fundamentally different from pre-revenue with an idea. Product is complete, website live, pricing published. The predecessor at Capstone generated \$500K/year from 5 enterprise clients with no dedicated sales effort.

Execution

Founder is not a salesperson

Capital is specifically allocated for two dedicated sales hires. Compelling ROI story (\$15/day to recover 234+ hours/year), live website, niche market with reachable buyers through known channels (LinkedIn, trade shows, industry associations).

Market

Niche market — 4,000 MSP facilities

At \$4,800/year, 400 facilities (10%) generates \$1.9M ARR. Modular platform supports expansion into adjacent workflows. In-plant market extends TAM beyond MSPs.

Personal

Founder and support lead currently without income or insurance

Operating budget addresses this directly. Founder compensation scales with customer acquisition. Support lead on W-2. Health insurance is the first addition when revenue supports it. Both people are fully committed and available immediately.

If the sales function has been funded, the trade shows attended, the product demonstrated, and the market still isn't buying — then the thesis was wrong and we shut it down. I will not burn an investor's remaining capital hoping for a turnaround the data doesn't support.

Where this goes

A platform that grows with demand. A company owned by the people who build it.

Platform expansion

FloorPulse is modular by design. The core platform — mail.dat parsing, local server, browser UI, real-time infrastructure — supports additional application modules.

Shipping	Module 1: Production visibility
Requested	Module 2: Commingle / co-pal routing
Roadmap	Scheduling, postal acceptance, manifests

Each module uses the same server, same browser workstations, same mail.dat data. A facility has already requested Module 2, validating the platform approach with organic market pull.

Exit vision: ESOP

The long-term goal is a company owned by the people who build and support the product — not optimized for a liquidation event.

How it works: Founder sells equity to the ESOP trust over time (~10%/year), creating a gradual, tax-advantaged transition. ESOP trust purchases shares at fair market value determined by annual independent valuation.

Investor exit: ESOP purchases investor shares at fair market value — or earlier if both parties agree on a buyback.

Why 51%: The founder stake exists to deliver on this commitment. An investor aligned with this vision is the right investor. One looking for a quick flip is not.

Alternative exit: Strategic acquisition. BlueCrest expressed strong interest in production visibility during the Capstone era — significant enough to pursue an acquisition. BlueCrest personnel are actively following the FloorPulse build-in-public campaign on LinkedIn. This positions BlueCrest as both a potential enterprise customer and a potential strategic acquirer.

What I need from an investor — and what I don't

I don't want someone to throw money at this in hopes of making a return. I've seen that movie. At Capstone, the investors funded headcount ahead of revenue, assumed growth would follow spending, and shut the company down when it didn't. The product didn't fail — the business was built on hope instead of discipline.

What I need is a partner who participates — not someone who writes a check and watches from the sideline. That can take many forms: a board seat, advisory role, quarterly reviews, introductions, or simply being the person who pushes back when I'm wrong and supports the plan when it's working. Someone who brings industry access, operational experience, or knowledge of a better approach to getting this product into facilities faster.

The right investor makes the sales cycle shorter — through connections, credibility, or experience that money alone can't buy. An investor with a rolodex in this industry changes the math entirely. The wrong investor is the one who funded Capstone.

The product is built. The market is waiting. The only thing between here and 79 customers is execution — and that's what this capital funds.

Live product
floorpulse.net

Business case
Published with full
ROI

IT / Security
Pre-answered
assessment

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